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Spotlight on Safety at Nuclear Power Plants:
The View from Oyster Creek
RICHARD WEBSTER* WITH JULIA LEMENSE**

I. ABSTRACT
This article shows that the ongoing litigation over the relicensing of
the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant (“Oyster Creek”) and a few other
nuclear power plants continues to put a spotlight on the regulation of safety
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”). The glare of the
spotlight has already revealed that the NRC Staff has largely lost touch with
the basic purpose of the agency, which is solely to regulate safety, not to
promote nuclear power.1 Instead, at Oyster Creek (and some other nuclear
plants), the Staff has appeared more concerned about dismissing any
concerns raised by their safety reviews rather than enforcing the safety
requirements, which are themselves often unclear or ambiguous. This
misguided agenda has been evident in decisions about both ongoing safety
and relicensing. Happily, even though the litigation procedures are
inadequate, when certain decisions have been vigorously litigated, some
relief has been forthcoming from administrative adjudicatory bodies such as
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (“ASLB”) and the Commission
itself. However, the current procedures are extremely hostile to effective
* Mr. Webster is the legal director of the Eastern Environmental Law Center and
represented six citizens’ groups that opposed the relicensing of the Oyster Creek Nuclear
Power Plant, the oldest in the nation. In addition to a law degree from Columbia Law
School, Mr. Webster has a degree in physics from Oxford University, a Masters degree in
engineering hydrology from Imperial College of Science and Technology, and long
experience as a scientific consultant for industry, governments, multilateral entities, and
environmental groups. The views expressed in this paper are his own, not those of his clients
or his employer.
** Ms. Julia LeMense, Executive Director, Eastern Environmental Law Center, played
an invaluable role in the development of this article by working with the author to litigate the
Oyster Creek case, co-authoring briefs containing many of the concepts that went into this
article, and refining the expression of those concepts. The author would also like to
acknowledge the role of the many others who have helped develop the concepts expressed in
this article through discussions and collaborations with the author, including Paul Gunter,
David Lochbaum, Dianne Curran, Philip Musegaas, Anthony Roisman, John Sipos, Jon
Block, and Janice Dean.
1. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, History, http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/history.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
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intervention by public-interest groups and many decisions, such as
relicensing, can be taken without a hearing or Commission action in the
absence of intervention. Therefore, many decisions taken by the NRC Staff
go into effect without any searching internal or external review. This lack
of effective review reduces the quality of these decisions. Thus, without
serious reform of both the safety culture of the staff and the internal and
external review procedures, the ability of the NRC to carry out its mandate
to ensure that nuclear power plants within the United States are operated
safely is seriously in doubt. One element of reform should be to ensure that
before major decisions, like relicensing, are taken there is an effective
internal review of NRC Staff actions by the ASLB and then the
Commission. However, experience has shown that even the Commission is
subject to strong pressure from the regulated community. Robust external
review of NRC decisions is therefore critical if the agency is to avoid
recapture by the industry. The best approach to providing such a review is
to actively encourage citizen involvement in the decision-making processes
of the NRC through greater transparency, opportunities for funding, and the
use of fairer procedures.
II. STRUCTURE
The first issue considered by this article is why the litigation about the
relicensing of Oyster Creek shed new light on the NRC’s regulation of
safety when, at the time the litigation commenced, over forty nuclear power
plants had already been relicensed and Oyster Creek itself had been
operating for over thirty-six years. There are at least three reasons for this.
First, the ability of the public to challenge the ongoing safety of a nuclear
power plant is very limited because the designated procedure lacks
discovery rights, has seldom resulted in effective relief for public-interest
groups, if ever, and is not generally subject to judicial review. The lack of
discovery rights is a major impediment to full review because during
operation many safety-related documents are unavailable to the public.
Second, at the behest of the nuclear industry during the 1990s, the NRC
systematically narrowed the scope of the safety issues that could be raised
during a relicensing proceeding to exclude most of the issues that were of
most concern to many members of the public living close to nuclear plants,
such as evacuation. Finally, in 2004, the NRC changed its adjudicatory
rules reducing discovery rights and curtailing the right to crossexamination. The net effect is that prior to the litigation involving Oyster
Creek, public interest groups in relicensing proceedings had their claims
dismissed at a very early stage, prior to any discovery, and the NRC
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approved every relicensing application it received within the twenty-two to
thirty month guideline it had set for itself.2 Therefore, the Oyster Creek
proceeding was the first relicensing proceeding to probe deeply into how
the NRC was regulating a specific safety issue with the benefit of
substantial disclosure of documents from the licensee. It is also the first
relicensing proceeding that went beyond the guideline time-period,
although the Commission eventually granted the renewed license on April
1, 2009, a few days before the original license was due to expire.
Next, this article uses publicly available information from various
sources, including the Oyster Creek proceedings and related reviews, to
conclude that the NRC, as an agency, is not doing an effective job in
managing the safety risks at nuclear power plants. More specifically, the
ongoing reviews of safety have been shown to be inadequate in certain
areas and, at best, questionable in others. Critically, the Oyster Creek
proceedings showed that these reviews are hampered by a lack of
understanding of the regulatory requirements at each plant. In addition, the
safety reviews during relicensing are very limited in scope and, even within
that scope, have missed important issues. It is now clear that the safety
margins at Oyster Creek are much narrower than when the plant opened in
1969, if indeed there is any margin of safety at all. In addition, the State of
New Jersey has alleged that the NRC has failed to adequately assess the risk
of terrorism, which was not considered at all during initial licensing or
during relicensing. Finally, the NRC has also declared that it did not intend
to increase the standards for safety during relicensing. Because safety
margins have reduced over time due to aging and new threats, Oyster Creek
is now clearly less safe than it was forty years ago. At the same time the
NRC has allowed safety margins to reduce at old nuclear plants, it has
increased the safety requirements for new plants. This inconsistency in
approach has created an increasing gap between the safety-requirements for
a new plant and those for a relicensed plant. It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that the trend is toward relicensing of old plants rather than
replacement with new plants.
Finally, this article describes potential solutions to the problems that
have been identified. Although the relicensing proceedings for Oyster
Creek and other reactors highlighted these problems, most of the identified
failures relate to regulation of ongoing safety. As the NRC itself has
repeatedly argued, if regulation of ongoing safety were fully effective, there
would be little safety analysis to be done during a relicensing proceeding.

2. 10 C.F.R. § 2.332(b) (2005); 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, app. B (2009).
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Thus, without diminishing the importance of a comprehensive review of
safety issues associated with relicensing and the need to update safety
standards prior to relicensing, this author believes that reform should also
be targeted at ensuring the adequate regulation of ongoing safety. Such
reforms should include full transparency, technical assistance to publicinterest groups, and a “citizen suit” provision that would allow such groups
the right to raise issues concerning nuclear safety with the district court.
Similarly, the relicensing rules should be amended to make the safety
review conducted prior to relicensing comprehensive, to make intervention
in the relicensing proceeding more accessible to citizens, and to provide a
mandatory hearing on issues where there is no citizen challenge.
A. Statutory And Regulatory Requirements of The Atomic Energy Act
Regarding Safety
The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) of 1954, limits the original license
of commercial nuclear power plants to forty years.3 Section 103 of the
AEA, 42 U.S.C. § 2133, grants the Commission authority to issue licenses
for the commercial exploitation of special nuclear material. It states that
such licenses “may be renewed upon the expiration of” the initial licensed
period.4 However, the Commission is required to find that the authorized
utilization of special nuclear material is “in accord with the common
defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and
safety of the public.”5 The “not inimical” standard also governs license
renewal of operating nuclear reactors.6 Finally, the AEA provides that in
any licensing proceeding, the Commission shall grant a hearing at the
request of any potentially affected party.7
B. Petitions About Ongoing Safety
In theory, citizens may request enforcement of the NRC’s safetyrequirements through a petition described by 10 C.F.R. § 2.206. However,

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2009).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(c) (2009).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (2009) (“no license may be
issued to any person within the United States if . . . in the opinion of the Commission, the
issuance of a license to such a person would be inimical to the common defense and security
or to the health and safety of the public”).
6. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943,
64,961 (Dec. 13, 1991) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 50, 54, 140).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) (2009).
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this process suffers from at least two key problems. First, even though such
a petition must “specify the action requested and set forth the facts that
constitute the basis for the request” there is no provision for discovery.8
Thus, the petitioner must glean all the information required from public
sources. This is a very difficult task because even the basic safety
requirements that each plant must meet, called the “Current Licensing
Basis” (“CLB”), are not compiled.9 In fact, experience at Oyster Creek
showed that even the NRC Staff got the CLB wrong throughout the hearing
process on the safety of the containment system.10 Finally, many of the
underlying documents on specific safety issues are unobtainable because
the NRC Staff either does not retain them, or reviews them at the licensee’s
site.11 Thus, a lack of transparency is one critical hindrance to citizens
participating effectively in the ongoing oversight of nuclear plants.
Second, citizens groups have become disillusioned with the § 2.206
process because the NRC Staff effectively reviews its own work and the
rights of appeal are very limited. It is hardly surprising that the Staff
normally finds that its own actions are sufficient and justified.
Furthermore, petitioners do not have a right to appeal an adverse decision to
the Commission.12 Finally, at least the Second Circuit has found that a
refusal to take enforcement action pursuant to a § 2.206 petition is not
judicially reviewable under the doctrine articulated in Heckler v. Chaney.13
However, other courts have found that there is an exception to this
presumption of unreviewablity, where the § 2.206 petition relates to
licensing.14 At a minimum, petitioners’ rights to judicial review are in

8. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (2009).
9. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Station Units 2 and 3), Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Petitions to Intervene and
Requests for Hearing), LBP-08-13, 18-19 (Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50 286-LR, July 31,
2008) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML082130436.
10. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co., LLC (License Renewal for Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station), Initial Decision (Rejecting Citizens’ Challenge to AmerGen’s
Application to Renew its Operating License for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station) LBP-07-17, 19-20, n. 20 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Dec. 18, 2007) available at
ADAMS Accession No. ML073520402.
11. NRC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, Audit of NRC’s License Renewal
Program, OIG-07-A-15, 14-15 (Sept. 6, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML072490486.
12. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) (2009); 10 C.F.R. §2.206(c) (2009).
13. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156
(2d Cir. 2004).
14. Nuclear Info. Res. Service v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 969 F.2d 1169, 1178
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
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doubt and petitions for enforcement of NRC regulations during operation
are unlikely to be reviewable.
C. Development of the Relicensing Rules
To implement the AEA requirements, the Commission has
promulgated regulations that lay out the specific requirements for
relicensing. In the early 1980s, the NRC first started to address the
standards for license renewal. As a result of that effort, the agency decided
in 1991, that “age related degradation will be critical to safety during the
term of [a] renewed license.” Accordingly, the Commission established a
requirement for a plant-wide review of age-related degradation.15 The
regulations also required licensees to demonstrate that they had effective
programs for management of aging equipment.16 At that time, the NRC
excluded other issues, such as emergency planning or updating the CLB,
because the NRC believed they were adequately addressed by other existing
regulations.17
In 1995, the Commission further narrowed the scope of the plant-wide
review. It decided that with the possible exception of age-related
degradation of long-lived passive components, the safety-related effects of
aging are adequately managed by the ongoing regulatory scheme.18 Thus,
the Commission narrowed the scope of the safety review upon relicensing
to cover only age-related degradation of long-lived passive components.19
In narrowing the scope of the equipment covered by the rule, however, the
NRC did not alter the fundamental principles underlying the 1991,
rulemaking, including that: (a) age-related degradation poses a threat to the
continued safe operation of nuclear power plants, and (b) safety must be
maintained throughout the license renewal period by managing the effects
of aging:
The objective of a license renewal review is to determine whether
the detrimental effects of aging, which could adversely affect the
functionality of systems, structures, and components that the
Commission determines require review for the period of extended

15. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943, 64,960 (Dec. 13,
1991).
16. Id. at 64,955.
17. Id. at 64,959.
18. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg 22,461, 22,464
(May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54).
19. Id.
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operation, are adequately managed. The license renewal review is
intended to identify any additional actions that will be needed to
maintain the functionality of the systems, structures, and
components in the period of extended operation.20
Thus, in two steps, the Commission excluded many safety issues from the
relicensing process. Ostensibly, the intent behind the 1995 amendments
was to base license renewal on a “predictable and stable regulatory process”
that permits licensees “to make decisions about license renewal without
being influenced by a regulatory process that is perceived to be uncertain,
unstable, or not clearly defined.”21 These two rulemakings actually made
the process more predictable by excluding from the relicensing safety
reviews many of the issues that were of most concern to citizens living
close to nuclear plants, such as evacuation and the risk of terrorism.22
The NRC claims that a broader review at the license renewal stage is
redundant because the ongoing regulatory schemes, particularly the CLB,
the maintenance rule, and corrective actions, provide sufficient protection
against safety and health hazards.23 Each plant’s CLB is required to be
maintained during the renewal term in the same manner and to the same
extent as during the original licensing term. The maintenance rule requires
that nuclear power reactor licensees monitor equipment against licenseeestablished goals to “provide reasonable assurance” of its functionality.24
The regulations call for immediate corrective actions when “conditions
adverse to quality” such as “failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations,
defective material and equipment, and nonconformance” are detected.25
Thus, in theory, there should be few issues to deal with at license renewal.
Even the requirement of reviewing the aging of passive, long-lived,
safety related equipment is subject to exceptions. When the renewal
applicant can “demonstrate that their facility has specific programs or
processes in place to detect ongoing degradation” the NRC permits some
covered structures and components to be “generically excluded from further

20. Id. at 22,464.
21. Id. at 22,462.
22. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),
CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3, 6, 21-22 (2001).
23. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg 22,461, 22,464,
22,466 (May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54).
24. Id. at 22,470.
25. 10 C.F.R § 50, app. B, (2009).
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aging management review” at license renewal.26 In fact, the nuclear
industry has requested that the NRC narrow the license renewal rule even
further, which the NRC has promised to do once it “gains more experience
with the effect of aging during the period of extended operation.”27
Thus, in 1991 and 1995, the NRC effectively determined that, apart
from the possible exception of age-related degradation of long-lived passive
components during the license extension period, there are no major gaps in
the current regulations that ensure safe operation of nuclear power plants or
in their implementation. Unfortunately, this conclusion was not based upon
rigorous analysis of the ongoing processes, but rather upon the mere
existence of those processes.28 In fact, much empirical and anecdotal
evidence, presented below, suggests that the ongoing regulations are much
less effective than the NRC assumed when it adopted the relicensing rules.
D. Regulatory Requirements for Relicensing
A renewed license may only be issued if the Commission finds that
there is reasonable assurance of future compliance with the CLB.29 In an
operating license proceeding, the licensee generally bears the ultimate
burden of proof.30 The Commission confirmed in Florida Power & Light
Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), 54 NRC 3, 10
(2001), that because corrosion and other effects become more severe over
the extended license period, an applicant for license renewal must
demonstrate that its programs are adequate to manage the effects of aging,
including sufficient inspections and testing:
Part 54 requires renewal applicants to demonstrate how their
programs will be effective in managing the effects of aging during
the proposed period of extended operation. . . . Applicants must
identify any additional actions, i.e., maintenance, replacement of
parts, etc., that will need to be taken to manage adequately the
detrimental effects of aging. Adverse aging effects generally are
26. NRC, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,486
(May 8, 1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2, 51 54).
27. Id. at 22,487.
28. NRC, Foundation for the Adequacy of the Licensing Bases, A Supplement to the
Statement of Considerations for the Rule on Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal (10
C.F.R. part 54), Final Report, NUREG-1412 (Dec. 31, 1991) available at ADAMS
Accession No. ML080310668.
29. 10 C.F.R. § 54.29 (2009).
30. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16
N.R.C. 1265, 1271 (1982).
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gradual and thus can be detected by programs that ensure sufficient
inspections and testing.31
The critical issue is the meaning of the phrase reasonable assurance. Where
there is a high degree of certainty that a facility complies with the CLB
requirements, the exact meaning of “reasonable assurance” does not come
into play.32 Thus, how the reasonable assurance standard is applied
depends on context. Historically, the reasonable assurance standard
involved use of a “reasonably conservative range of values of input
parameters.”33 However, in the recent decision largely denying the appeal
of the Oyster Creek licensing board initial decision, the Commission found
that the licensee could establish reasonable assurance by showing
compliance with applicable regulations by a preponderance of the
evidence.34 Perhaps mitigating this statement, in the same decision, the
Commission directed the Staff to enhance their supervision of modeling
studies that involved sensitivity analyses, which use a range of inputs to
take account of uncertainty.35 Thus, the best view is probably that an
applicant must show that when it uses a reasonably conservative range of
input parameters it can meet the CLB throughout any extended period of
operation, but licensees may now use the Oyster Creek licensing decision to
argue that such an approach is unnecessarily conservative.
III. THE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ONGOING PROCESSES MADE
DURING THE RELICENSING RULEMAKINGS ARE
UNSUPPORTED
A. Empirical Evidence
There are many examples of NRC failures to either recognize safety
problems or resolve them, but a few dramatic recent events serve to
illustrate that the NRC’s current approach to safety has serious flaws.
31. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),
CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3, 7, 10 (2001) (emphasis added).
32. E.g., North Anna Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.2d 655,
667-68 (1976).
33. In the Matter of Atlas Corp., DD-99-02, (Jan. 20, 1999).
34. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Company (License Renewal for Oyster Creek
Nuclear Generating Station), Memorandum and Order, CLI-09-07 (Apr. 1, 2009), slip op. at
35.
35. Id. at 67-68.
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Incredibly, the NRC failed to recognize that the increased threat of
terrorism since September 2001 had legal and factual implications for
ongoing safety and license renewal that required close analysis. Legally,
the NRC failed to recognize that because terrorist attacks on nuclear plants
became foreseeable, their potential consequences had to be included in the
environmental analysis carried out pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“NEPA”), prior to licensing or relicensing.36
Even after the Ninth Circuit decided this issue, the NRC refused to apply
this requirement to relicensing outside that Circuit.37 Factually, in 2005, a
National Academy of Sciences Report for Congress showed that the NRC
had failed to adequately assess the huge risk of storing spent fuel in
elevated pools that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. The consequences of a
spent fuel pool fire would be enormous. For example, estimates show that
one fuel pool fire could cause 24,000 lung cancers and economic damage
that could be ten times that caused by Hurricane Katrina.38 Even though it
is privy to safeguard information that the NRC claims has resolved this
issue, the State of New Jersey has stated that the spent fuel pool at the
Oyster Creek plant is a “major security concern”39 and litigated its ability to
raise this issue in relicensing in the Third Circuit.
In 2002, severe corrosion on the top of the reactor pressure vessel
caused the Davis-Besse reactor near Cleveland to come within months of a

36. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006).
37. The State of New Jersey claimed that the NRC should study the potential impact of
terrorism as part of the relicensing process for Oyster Creek. However, the Commission
ultimately rejected the impact as beyond the scope of the relicensing process. In the Matter
of AmerGen Energy Company (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station), Memorandum and Order, CLI-07-08, 1-2 (Feb. 26, 2007) available at ADAMS
Accession No. ML070570511. The Commission further stated that “nothwithstanding a
recent decision by United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit… we reiterate our
longstanding view that NEPA demands no terrorism inquiry.” Id. The Commission admitted
that while San Luis Obispo would require study of the impact of terrorist attacks prior to
relicensing, the Commission decided that it “disagree[d] with the Ninth Circuit’s view.” Id.
at 5. The Commission therefore decided to adhere to the San Luis Obispo decision only in
the Ninth Circuit by holding that terrorism is “beyond the scope” of relicensing in other
Circuits. Id. (citing In the Matter of Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1
& 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), 56 N.R.C. 358, 364 (2002)). New Jersey’s
appeal of this decision was recently denied by the Third Circuit in part on the basis that the
impact from a potential terrorist attack is not caused by the federal action in question. New
Jersey Dept. of Env’tl Protection v. NRC, 591 F.3d 132_(3rd Cir. 2009).
38. Letter from Richard Webster, Staff Attorney, Rutgers Envtl. Law Clinic, to Chief,
Rules Review and Directives Branch U.S. N.R.C. 2, 12-15 (Sept. 8, 2006) available at
ADAMS Accession No. ML062610359.
39. Letter from Lipoti, Director of N.J. Division of Environmental Safety and Health, to
Richard Webster (Jan. 2, 2008).
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melt down. The NRC Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) concluded
that by allowing the plant to operate beyond a deadline for fixing the
problem, the agency had placed the economic interests of the plant owner
above the safety of the public. In addition, the OIG found that the NRC had
“informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute
proof of a safety problem” instead of acting when the licensee can no longer
affirmatively show that safety is reasonably assured.40 A 2002 survey
showed that 47% of the NRC’s employees are afraid to speak out about
safety issues because they fear doing so would jeopardize their jobs, and
that employees were concerned that pressure from the industry is greatly
undermining the agency’s ability to oversee safety. In 2003, the Witt
Report regarding the evacuation plan for the Indian Point Nuclear Power
Plant highlighted many flaws in that plan.41
In August of 2007, a cooling tower cell at the Vermont Yankee plant
completely collapsed. In October of the same year, a video showing
sleeping guards at the Peach Bottom nuclear plant aired on national
television.
In addition, through participation in the Oyster Creek
proceeding, the intervenors discovered that the thickness measurements that
the NRC and the licensee had relied upon to show safety for ten years were
systematically wrong; the containment was thinner than those results
showed and possibly below the CLB requirement.42
More recently the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has
highlighted the need for better NRC oversight of fire safety.43 Despite the
discoveries in the early 1980s of an issue with short circuits and in the late
1980s that certain fire retardant materials failed to meet the specified level
of protection, the NRC is still struggling to devise a satisfactory approach to
fire protection.44 The NRC has also failed to track what measures are

40. NRC Office of the Inspector General Event Inquiry: NRC’s Regulation of DavisBesse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No. 02-03S), 23 (Dec. 30,
2002).
41. James Lee Witt and Associates, LLC, Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas
Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone (Mar. 7, 2003) available at http://www.wittassociates
.com/1296.xml.
42. See, e.g., NRC, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal
Application of Oyster Creek Generating Station, Excerpts, NUREG-1875, 3-127 (Apr. 30,
2007) (finding definite bias in the 1996 readings) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML072851132.
43. GAO, NRC’s Oversight of Fire Protection at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Units Could
Be Strengthened, GAO- 08-747 (June 2008) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML081840045.
44. Id. at 18-23.
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actually in place to protect from fires; instead it relies on licensee
documents that are not available to citizens.45
Finally, during the preparation of this article, Vermont Yankee had yet
more problems with leakage from the cooling towers and an inspection at
Oyster Creek showed that corrosion of the containment was ongoing
despite the many assurances that had been provided by witnesses for the
NRC Staff and the reactor operator.46 In his dissenting opinion regarding
the Oyster Creek relicensing, Commissioner Jaczko noted that “the expert
testimony the Board found persuasive was optimistic, at best.”47
B. Evidence From NRC Adjudications
As discussed above, few NRC Staff decisions are scrutinized by the
adjudicatory arm of the NRC, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(“ASLB”). Yet, in the proceedings that have occurred, some judges within
the ASLB have been critical of how the NRC Staff has been approaching
safety issues. For example, one judge recently raised questions about the
safety culture of the NRC Staff, stating that the approach taken to two
issues “may be symptomatic of safety culture deficiencies, and thus raise a
serious question about a foundation of nuclear safety – the culture of the
government organization responsible for promoting it.”48 Although Judge
Farrar stated that an alternative explanation could be that the NRC Staff
behavior in that proceeding was “aberrational,” other proceedings confirm
that it was not.49 For example, as mentioned above, in the relicensing
proceeding regarding the Oyster Creek power plant in New Jersey, the Staff
announced that that the safety of the containment vessel should not be
judged by whether it meets the engineering code.
In another recent case, the ASLB found that the NRC Staff had
exhibited a “more than casual attitude” regarding the safety of the public
45. Id. at 23-24.
46. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station),
Motion by Counsel to Reopen the Record and to Postpone Final Disposition of the
Relicensing Decision, 3-7, 14-15 (Docket No 50-219-LR, Feb. 2, 2009) available at
ADAMS Accession No. ML090480395.
47. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station),
Memorandum and Order, CLI- 09-07 (Docket No. 50-219-LR, Apr. 1, 2009) (partial dissent
of Commissioner Jaczko at 7) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML 090930344.
48. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Servs. (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility),
Licensing Board Memorandum and Order, LBP-08-11 at 46 (Docket No.70-3098-MLA, Jun.
27, 2008) (concurring opinion of Judge Farrar) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML081790253.
49. Id.
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living close to a site where piles of radioactive wastes had been left
uncovered for ten years after the plant stopped handling radioactive
materials.50 The Board found that residents who might be affected by
groundwater contamination were entitled to greater consideration.
In mandatory hearings on Early Site Permit (“ESP”) applications, the
ASLB is obliged to review the Staff’s performance with respect to
uncontested issues.51 In several recent ESP cases, the ASLB has found
significant deficiencies in the quality of the NRC Staff’s reviews, thereby
supporting the need for greater Commission supervision of the NRC Staff.
In the Clinton ESP proceeding, for example, the ASLB found “many
instances” in which “the technical portions of the Staff documents in the
record (particularly the SER and to some degree, the EIS) did not support a
finding that the Staff’s review supported its decisions.”52 In these
instances, the ASLB was unable to make judgments about the adequacy of
the ESP application because “the record as initially presented to us often
did not supply adequate technical information or flow of logic to permit a
judgment as to whether the Staff had a reasonable basis for its
conclusions.”53 Furthermore, the ASLB was forced to make many inquiries
due to “the lack of explanation and lack of clarity found in a large portion
of the [final] SER.”54 The ASLB further found that the draft SER
contained “a plethora of instances where the Staff’s conclusions could only
be characterized as conclusory.”55
The final SER, although an
improvement, “still failed in a large number of instances to logically
connect facts to conclusions.”56
In addition to the concerns about the lack of clear logic, the ASLB was
also concerned that the NRC Staff had not verified the facts asserted by the
applicant.57 The Board found that, for the relatively simple matters at issue
in an early site permit proceeding, this was acceptable, but for construction

50. In the Matter of Shieldalloy Metallurgical Group Corp., Memorandum (Licensing
Amendment Request for Decommissioning of the Newfield, New Jersey Facility), LBP-0808, 13-14 (Docket No. 40-7102-MLA, June 2, 2008) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML081540188.
51. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site) CLI-05-17, 62
N.R.C. 134 (2005).
52. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28,
64 N.R.C. 460, 474-75 (2006).
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 480.
56. Id. at 481.
57. Id. at 491-93.
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permits or a combined license application, such an approach would be
“extremely troubling.”58 It also noted that the Board’s “confidence in the
Staff’s judgment would have been materially improved had the more
important of those facts [the Staff’s factual findings] been checked.”59 The
ASLB noted that the wide variation in the level of detail in different subsections of the final SER implied, at minimum, a lack of co-ordination, and,
at worst, a lack of supervision.60 Emphasizing its concern with the quality
of the reporting, the ASLB explicitly stated that it did not conduct further
inquiries into these issues because it felt bound by a Commission
instruction to defer to the NRC Staff.61 Without that instruction from the
Commission, the ASLB would have conducted “a much more probing
review” into the quality of the review and reporting.62
As a result of these issues, the ASLB found nearly ninety safety
matters that required further explanation, sixty that required inquiry beyond
the first set of questions, and a number that required resolution at an oral
hearing.63 In the end, the ASLB found that issuance of the Clinton ESP
would not be inimical to common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public.64 However, the decision makes clear that to make that
finding the ASLB had to prompt the Staff in many areas to provide logical
explanations that it could rely upon. In addition, the ASLB would not have
been comfortable relying on unverified facts supplied by the applicant, if it
had not been instructed by the Commission to do so.
Similarly, in the two other ESP decisions, the Board found many
issues that needed clarification and follow-up after the NRC Staff’s review
was complete. For example, in the North Anna ESP proceeding, the ASLB
issued a “wave of safety questions” initially and finally concluded that
seven topics needed to be addressed by oral testimony.65 The Board found
that after the NRC Staff review, “six fundamental questions” remained for
which insufficient information was available prior to the ASLB

58. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28,
64 N.R.C. 460, 492-93 (2006).
59. Id. at 492.
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id. at 492.
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id. at 479.
64. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28,
64 N.R.C. 460, 497-98 (2006).
65. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site),
LBP-07-09, 65 N.R.C. 539, 563 (2007).
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proceeding.66 Only after taking account of all of the record evidence,
including that added by the ASLB proceeding, did the Board find the record
was sufficient to support a “not inimical” finding.”67 Likewise, in the
Grand Gulf ESP proceeding the ASLB found that in several instances, it
was necessary for the ASLB to “amplify, modify, or change statements” in
the SER.”68 The Board, therefore, deferred a number of issues to later
stages.69 Thus, in all three ESP proceedings completed to date, the Board
felt it necessary to significantly supplement the record of the NRC Staff’s
safety review in order to have sufficient information to make the findings
required by the AEA.
IV. RULES REGARDING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
SAFETY DECISIONS DURING RELICENSING
A. Obtaining Intervenor Status
To obtain an adjudicatory hearing on an issue concerning relicensing,
public interest groups must first petition to intervene and have a contention
admitted. The rules regarding contentions are provided by 10 C.F.R. §
2.309. First, petitioners must state the contention by providing “a specific
statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.”70 Next
petitioners must “[p]rovide a brief explanation of the basis for the
contention,”71 and “a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert
opinions which support the petitioner’s position.”72 This element of the
rule ensures that “full adjudicatory hearings are triggered only by those able
to proffer . . . minimal factual and legal foundation in support of their
contentions.”73
Petitioners must also demonstrate that the issues raised in their
contentions are within the scope of the proceeding.74 This hurdle has often
proved fatal for petitioners precisely because the scope of the safety issues
66. Id. at 629.
67. Id. at 599, 629.
68. System Energy Resources (Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), LBP-07-01,
65 N.R.C. 27, 102 (2007).
69. Id. at 102-03.
70. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i) (2009).
71. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(ii) (2009).
72. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (2009).
73. In the Matter of Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3),
CLI-99-11, 49 N.R.C. 328, 334 (1999).
74. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii) (2009).
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reviewed during relicensing is so narrow. In addition, the regulations
require petitioners to “[d]emonstrate that the issue raised in the contention
is material to the findings the N.R.C. must make to support the action that is
involved in the proceeding.”75 A showing of materiality should not be an
onerous requirement, because all that is needed is a “minimal showing that
material facts are in dispute, indicating that a further inquiry is
appropriate.”76
Finally, the contention must be timely. This seems deceptively simple
because the NRC asks for petitions to intervene and so petitions made on or
before the specified deadline are necessarily timely. However, the deadline
for contentions is normally set long before the NRC Staff reaches a
conclusion on the adequacy of the relicensing application. Thus, potential
petitioners do not get the benefit of seeing which areas are the subject of
further inquiry by the Staff, nor do they know how the aging managements
programs proposed in the license renewal application will change during
the Staff review.
Although the text of the rules is somewhat unclear, the ASLB, in a
number of decisions, has recognized that petitioners may add new safety
contentions after filing their initial petition, if they act in accordance with
10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) (2009).77 This Section requires a showing that:
(i) The information upon which the amended or new contention is
based was not previously available;
(ii) The information upon which the amended or new contention is
based is materially different than information previously available;
and
(iii) The amended or new contention has been submitted in a timely
fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information.78
However, as is discussed below, the ASLB in the Oyster Creek proceeding
was very reluctant to allow new contentions to be admitted even when they
were based on what was ostensibly new and materially different
information.

75. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv) (2009).
76. Georgia Inst. Tech., CLI-95-12, 42 N.R.C. 111, 118 (1995); Rules of Practice for
Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg.
33, 171 (Aug. 11, 1989) (final rule) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 2).
77. See, e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC (Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-32, 62 N.R.C. 813 (2005).
78. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii) (2009).
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B. The Adjudicatory Procedures for Licensing Cases
The coup de grace in terms of limiting citizen participation in
relicensing was delivered in 2004, when the NRC changed the procedural
rules to try to streamline the administrative adjudication of contentions in
licensing decisions.79 The new rules did away with the trial-type
proceeding that had been used and, by default, replaced it with a hybrid
approach that allowed for mandatory document disclosure, exchange of
direct testimony, briefing prior to a hearing, and a hearing at which all the
questioning of witnesses would be by the administrative judges, not by the
attorneys for each party.80 The new rules only provide for the use of trialtype procedures for reactor licensing hearings if the presiding officer finds
that the “contested matter necessitates resolution of issues of material fact
relating to the occurrence of a past activity, where the credibility of an
eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue, and/or issues of
motive or intent of the party or eyewitness [are] material to the resolution of
the contested matter.”81
The First Circuit found that these rule changes would meet the
statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, provided the
NRC was true to its word and allowed cross-examination when necessary
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.82 However, the court warned that
if the NRC was not true to its word and did not allow cross-examination
when required, “nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules against
future challenges.”83
These procedural rules created many challenges for potential
petitioners. For example, while applicants have many years to prepare an
application, intervenors only have sixty days to submit their proposed issues
for adjudication.84 Furthermore, because experts are an essential part of the
process, intervenors must quickly find and fund experts on nuclear-related
matters willing to testify against the nuclear industry. This is not easy
given the limited resources available to most potential petitioners.

79. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 344 (1st Cir. 2004).
80. Id. at 345.
81. Id. at 344, n.3 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d) (2009)).
82. Id. at 351; NRC, Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,182, 2,195-96
(Jan. 14, 2004) (final rule).
83. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 354 (1st Cir. 2004).
84. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Servs. (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility),
Licensing Board Memorandum and Order, LBP-08-11 at 45 (Docket No.70-3098-MLA, Jun.
27, 2008) (concurring opinion of Judge Farrar) available at ADAMS Accession No.
ML081790253.
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Even when a hearing is granted, intervenors face formidable hurdles in
obtaining a fair hearing. One judge noted that intervenors had brought
valuable issues to the Board’s attention, despite these disadvantages and
wondered how much more the public might contribute to nuclear safety, if
the NRC’s procedural rules allowed them to.85 For example, raising new
issues is very difficult and intervenors are forced to dissipate scarce
resources on duplicative filings to try to overcome very strict timing
requirements.86 Unless the judges are sympathetic, the proceeding “turn[s]
into a shell game, with the usual street-corner outcome: whatever guess the
Petitioners make will prove wrong.”87
Furthermore, in nearly all
proceedings intervenors must not only litigate against the applicants, they
must also litigate against the NRC Staff, who may opt to become a party.
Sometimes the Staff litigates issues even more vigorously than the licensee.
For example, the NRC Staff recently appealed the decision of the licensing
board in the Vermont Yankee license renewal proceeding, even though the
applicant decided not to appeal.
V. THE OYSTER CREEK EXPERIENCE
The net effect of the changes in the substantive and procedural rules
was to chill citizen participation in relicensing decisions. In 2006, for only
the second time in a relicensing proceeding, the coalition of six citizens’
groups managed to have a contention admitted. That contention concerned
the safety of the steel vessel that comprises the containment system. In
2007, the contention then became the subject of the first-ever public hearing
on a relicensing application. At that time over 44 of the 104 nuclear plants
in the United States had renewed their licenses without any hearing, a count
that has now increased to 55. Showing the positive aspects of citizen
participation, after the licensing board admitted the contention, the Oyster
Creek licensee improved its proposal for the aging management of the
containment five separate times in an effort to moot out the contention.88

85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id. at 54.
88. The intervention at Vermont Yankee further illustrates the positive effects of public
participation where citizens groups highlighted a safety issue involving metal fatigue
calculations; the NRC staff missed the same mistake at nine other reactors, but later
acknowledged that the calculations needed to be addressed. Ultimately, the licensing board
affirmed that additional metal fatigue calculations needed to be done prior to any licensing
decision. Bizarrely, the NRC Staff, but not the applicant, is currently appealing this decision
to the Commission.
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The Oyster Creek experience showed that the rules may produce a
streamlined decision process when they serve to exclude citizens, but they
produce the opposite effect when a contention is fully litigated. In practice,
application of the revised rules generated endless procedural motions in
response to emerging information and much confusion about the scope of
the hearing.89 As Judge Farrar recognized, because lawyers and experts
cost money, the huge imbalance in resources between citizens and plant
operators hampers citizens’ ability to get a fair hearing. This became
obvious at the Oyster Creek hearing when NRC and Exelon presented at
least sixteen expert witnesses to oppose the one witness the citizens could
afford.90 In addition, two public interest lawyers for the intervenors were
opposed by two lawyers for the NRC Staff and four lawyers from a large
law firm for the applicant. The resource imbalance is made all the more
important because the Board did not permit any cross-examination at the
hearing. This means there was no opportunity for the intervenors to compel
the applicant’s experts to make the intervenor’s case or probe for
weaknesses in the reassuring statements offered by the licensee. The issue
of cross-examination serves well to illustrate how the rules can serve as a
Catch-22. In practice, the Board found that cross-examination was only
permitted when intervenors could show that a witness was lying, but it is
extremely difficult to show that without the ability to depose the witness in
advance.91
Furthermore, if citizens try to find out what is going on at their local
plant without resorting to litigation they face many obstacles in obtaining
information. For example, prior to the intervention, some of the intervenors
tried to obtain measurements of the thickness of the containment shell at
Oyster Creek taken in 1996. They found, however, that the NRC did not
possess the information and the licensee refused to release it. At one point

89. See generally Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Oyster Creek License
Extension Application, http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensing/oyster.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009) (listing some of the many pleadings filed in the Oyster Creek relicensing
process).
90. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), Initial Decision, LBP-07-17, 29 n. 32 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Dec.
18, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML073520402.
91. The legality of the Board’s decision is called into question by a subsequent
inspection report that shows that many of the witnesses at the hearing gave testimony in
favor of relicensing that was either incorrect or overly optimistic. Webster, supra note 38.
Although the NRC promised the First Circuit that it would allow cross-examination
whenever required for full and true disclosure of the facts, it is now apparent that the
procedures at the Oyster Creek hearing were insufficient to generate such disclosure from
the licensee. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 351 (1st Cir. 2004).
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in the proceeding the licensing board even faulted the intervenors for failing
to obtain this information prior to filing their contention, when in fact they
had made diligent efforts to obtain it.92 As discussed above, when this
information was finally disclosed it showed that these measurements
showed that the metal thickness in all ten areas measured had increased,
which is physically impossible.93
Even during litigation, licensees may try to exclude citizens or limit
their participation by refusing to release information. For example, even
though the NRC has recognized that there may be a problem with the metal
fatigue calculations at Oyster Creek, Exelon has refused to release these
calculations.94 The NRC Staff managed to review these calculations, but
shielded them from release through the Freedom of Information Act by
carrying out their work in the licensee’s office.95
In addition, because the information obtained is highly technical,
citizens need experts to interpret it. In the wake of the 1979, accident at
Three Mile Island, all of the major accident reviews recommended that
funding be made available to responsible citizens’ groups so that they could
act as a deterrent to regulatory agency complacency. Congress has so far
failed to do this, but it is long overdue.
During the Oyster Creek proceeding, the citizens attempted to file a
number of contentions based upon new information, but this proved a
frustrating process. For example, during the Oyster Creek proceeding, the
NRC Staff commissioned Sandia National Laboratories (“Sandia”) to
review the modeling providing the basis for the acceptance criteria for the
thickness of the containment vessel at Oyster Creek.96 Although Sandia
used favorable assumptions about the thickness of the vessel, Sandia found
that a key enhancement used by the licensee to increase the apparent
strength of the vessel was not justified in certain circumstances and that the
vessel barely met the safety requirements.97 However, when citizens

92. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), Memorandum and Order (Granting Permission to File a New
Contention), LBP-06-22 at 31-32 (Docket No. 50-021-LR, Oct. 10, 2006) available at
ADAMS Accession No. ML062830381.
93. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Safety Evaluation Report, supra note 42.
94. E-mail from Polonsky to Webster, (Apr. 11, 2008) (on file with author).
95. N.R.C. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request 2008-0283, (Aug. 13,
2008).
96. Jason P. Petti, Sandia National Laboratories, Structural Integrity Analysis of the
Degraded Drywell Containment at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,
SAND2007-0055 at 11 (Jan. 12, 2007) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML070120395.
97. Id. at 77-82.
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sought to admit a new contention based upon the new work by Sandia, the
Board found that the information was not new, because Sandia had merely
reviewed old data and the intervenors could have commissioned their own
similar study.98 This is akin to telling the finders of the Rosetta Stone that
it was not important and it contained no new information, because those
who were trying to translate hieroglyphics could have done so without it,
had they been sufficiently skilled. Clearly, had citizens known about
Sandia’s study at the time the initial contentions were due, they could have
easily alleged that the acceptance criteria which were based on the
enhancement were incorrect. Because this information did not come out
until over a year after the time for initial contentions were due, citizens
were denied the opportunity to fully litigate this issue.
In the initial decision on Oyster Creek the Board found that there was
reasonable assurance that the containment system met and would continue
to meet the CLB. Judge Barrata, however, in an additional statement,
warned that additional analysis was needed prior to the commencement of
the extended period of operation and set out some requirements for the
analysis. Specifically, he stated that he believed that the licensee failed to
“fully” show that “there is reasonable assurance that the factor of safety
required by the regulations will be met throughout the period of extended
operation.”99 This is because “to date . . . no analysis of the actual
condition of the drywell has been done.”100 Therefore, “[t]o date we do not
know what the actual safety factor is.”101 Adding to the uncertainty caused
by this lack of analysis is “a very limited knowledge of the actual thickness
of the shell” because “there are large areas of the drywell in the sand bed
region that do not have recent measurements or any measurements at
all.”102 Therefore, “it [is] essential to have a conservative best estimate
analysis of the drywell shell before entering the period of extended

98. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), Memorandum and Order (Denying Citizens’ Motion for Leave to Add a
New Contention), 8-12 (Docket No. 50-0219-LR, Apr. 10, 2007) available at ADAMS
Accession No. ML071000374.
99. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Initial Decision, supra note 90, Additional
Statement of Judge Baratta at 1 (Although Judge Baratta did not style his “statement” as a
dissent, he states that he differs with his colleagues on whether the licensee has shown
reasonable assurance that the factor of safety, a CLB requirement, will be met. Because such
reasonable assurance is required before a license renewal can proceed, Judge Baratta’s
statement is effectively a dissent.).
100. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
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operation.”103 In addition, that analysis must take account of the
uncertainty.104 Therefore, the applicant should be required to perform a
series of sensitivity analyses.105 On appeal, the Commission found that it
was unclear whether a proposed license condition would meet Judge
Baratta’s requirements.
The Commission, therefore, remanded this
question back to the licensing board. On remand, the Board held another
hearing on this issue in September 2008 and subsequently recommended
imposing additional conditions on the analysis, including more robust
sensitivity analysis and further work by Sandia on the issue of the
enhancement discussed above, which citizens were able to raise belatedly
on remand.106 The Commission has somewhat vaguely endorsed these
recommendations in its decision to relicense Oyster Creek.107
Furthermore, it appears that the problems observed at Oyster Creek
may reflect systemic problems with the relicensing process. In an audit of a
number of relicensing reviews, including that for Oyster Creek, the NRC
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) highlighted that NRC’s relicensing
safety reviews suffered from a lack of quality control and were inconsistent
in terms of thoroughness.108 In addition, the safety review of the Oconee
plant stated that Staff had verified adequate performance of the coating
system, when in fact problems with coating failures were well known to the
NRC.109 In a follow up memorandum, the OIG found that because the Staff
had destroyed their working papers after each review was complete, it is
very difficult to verify in detail how well the safety reviews were carried
out.110
The Oyster Creek intervenors together with Riverkeeper and a number
of other intervenors in other proceedings have also shown that the NRC’s
relicensing safety reviews rely excessively upon unchecked licensee
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. at 6.
106. Memorandum (Addressing The Issue Referred By The Commission Regarding The
Adequacy Of AmerGen’s Proposed 3-D Finite Element Structural Analysis Studies), In the
Matter Of AmerGen Energy Co, LLC (License Renewal for Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station), 16-17 (Oct. 29, 2008).
107. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station),
Memorandum and Order, CLI- 09-07 at 67-68 (Docket No. 50-219-LR, Apr. 1, 2009)
available at ADAMS Accession No. ML 090930344.
108. NRC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, Audit of NRC’s License Renewal
Program, OIG-07-A-15, 7, 19-21 (Sept. 6, 2007).
109. Id. at 22-23.
110. Memorandum from Bell, Inspector General, NRC, to Klein, Chairman, NRC, 4 (May
8, 2008).
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summary documents, and that the NRC Staff prematurely destroyed the
working documents showing in detail how the safety review at Oyster
Creek was conducted.111 Although the Commission did not grant any relief
to remedy these problems, Commissioner Jackzo indicated in his dissent
that additional examination of the adequacy of the safety review should
have been carried out.112
In summary, through participation in the Oyster Creek proceeding and
review of public NRC documents, citizens were able gather over 50,000
pages of documents that were not previously in the public domain and
show:
1. the current licensing basis (“CLB”) is unclear and NRC Staff
have repeatedly attempted to manipulate the CLB to favor the
applicant;
2. “reasonable assurance” is a catch phrase that is not clear enough
for enforcement purposes;
3. the acceptance criteria applied to the thickness measurements at
Oyster Creek were inadequate to maintain the CLB;
4. measurements that Exelon and the previous owner had relied
upon to show safety for ten years were systematically biased in
favor of greater metal thickness;
5. the modeling work upon which the applicant was relying was
outdated, used a questionable enhancement, and did not take full
account of the uncertainties;
6. Exelon violated a commitment to monitor an important drain for
eight years before anyone noticed because its commitment
tracking was inadequate;
7. NRC Staff have a policy of reviewing important documents
away from NRC offices and then shielding the reviewed
documents from FOIA requests;
111. Supplemental Petitions by Listed Petitioners for Additional Investigation and
Correction of Deficiencies Regarding License Renewal Reviews, for Oyster Creek, Indian
Point, Pilgrim, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants, 3-6 ((Dockets Nos. 50-219-LR
(Oyster Creek), 50-247-LR & 50-286-LR (Indian Point), 50-293-LR (Pilgrim), and 50-271LR (Vermont Yankee), May 15, 2008)) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML081640245
(parties filed identical supplemental petitions).
112. In the Matter of AmerGen Energy Co., et al., Commission Memorandum and Order
Responding to the Petition and Supplemental Petition Filed By Intervenor Groups (Dockets
Nos. 50-219-LR (Oyster Creek), 50-247LR & 50-286-LR (Indian Point), 50-293-LR
(Pilgrim), and 50-271-LR (Vermont Yankee), 34-5 (CLI-08-23, Oct. 6, 2008)) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Jaczko) available at ADAMS Accession No. ML082800440.
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8. NRC Staff do not retain their working documents showing what
they actually do during safety reviews. It is therefore impossible
for the Commission to check the work of the staff;
9. The NRC Staff’s attitude is that unless there is an obvious
problem, they should not do any in-depth review – safety-culture
is lacking. Often, the staff does not check the facts given to it by
the licensee; and
10. Public participation leads to better decision-making.
The Oyster Creek experience has confirmed that the problems at the
NRC are deep rooted and has further undermined public confidence in the
agency. The Oyster Creek proceeding has accomplished what the
Commission and the industry may have hoped changes to the relicensing
and procedural rules would avoid; it has provided a window into NRC’s
ongoing safety processes and found them wanting.
VI. CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATION FOR NRC
REFORM
The deficiencies highlighted above show that the nuclear industry in
the United States is like the financial industry was prior to the crisis of
2008; there are many risks that are not being properly managed or
regulated. Just like the financial industry, the nuclear industry could be
destroyed if any of these risks actualize into another major incident like that
at Three Mile Island in 1979. Therefore, citizens and the nuclear industry
should now come together to create good processes for maintaining the
safety of operating nuclear plants.
With regard to ongoing safety, these processes should include:
i. Published, clear plant-specific safety standards upon which
citizens, the NRC, and investors can rely (i.e. codification of the
Current Licensing Basis (“CLB”) and licensee commitments);
ii. Requirements that CLB safety standards be met with a specified
high degree of statistical certainty;
iii. A centralized publicly accessible database of exemptions,
corrective actions, violations of CLB safety standards, and
violations of licensee commitments;
iv. Prompt notice to interested parties when the safety requirements in
the CLB or licensee commitments are changed or not met;
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v. Citizen access to all non-proprietary non-safeguards licensee
documents containing information relevant to nuclear safety and
access to redacted versions of proprietary or safeguards
documents;
vi. A publicly available log of all NRC documents withheld from
public release and a simple process to challenge Staff decisions to
withhold documents;
vii. Technical assistance grants to local citizens groups to enable them
to hire expert assistance; and
viii. A citizen suit provision (with fees when citizens prevail) so that
disputes about ongoing safety that the NRC Staff declines to
address can be resolved in the District Court under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and citizen groups would not be forced to
bear the costs of stepping in to make up for the failure of the NRC.
Recommended improvements specific to the relicensing process include:
i. Expand the scope beyond the aging management of long-lived passive
components to include:
a. A comprehensive review of whether safety standards in the CLB
should be improved based on a presumption that relicensed plants
should meet the same standards as new plants, unless the applicant
can show that that the cost of achieving the higher safety standard
would be disproportionate to the benefits;
b. A de novo review of current compliance with all CLB safety
standards and licensee commitments; and
c. Plant-specific resolution of generic safety issues.
ii. Change the Part 2 adjudication rules to more closely mirror the federal
rules of civil procedure, including:
a. Notice pleading with a liberal standard for adding or amending
issues for adjudication as more information comes to light;
b. Flexibility on timing;
c. Construe disputed facts in favor of petitioners;
d. Full discovery of the licensee’s knowledge, including depositions;
e. The right to live cross-examination; and
f.

Preventing NRC itself from participating as a party.

iii. Provide a mandatory hearing on safety issues where there is no
intervenor.
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In the absence of these improvements, the NRC will struggle to escape
capture by the nuclear industry and, even if it is temporarily invigorated by
the addition of new Commissioners that regard citizen participation more
favorably and emphasize safety over production, it will tend to revert to
ineffectiveness like the Atomic Energy Commission before it.
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